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THE PENNSYLVANIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATUTE:
ITS FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE
TAX IMPLICATIONS
By
EDWARD

N.

POLISHER*

With the approval by Governor Duff on July 7, 1947 of Senate Bill No. 615,
effective September 1, 1947, Pennsylvania joined the fast-growing ranks of the

community property states. The Bureau of Internal Revenue has recently indicated that it will recognize Pennsylvania's statute for income tax purposes: Letter
from Commissioner of Internal Revenue, August 25, 1947; Legal Intelligencer,
August 28, 1947. The legislatures of Oregon, Michigan and Nebraska enacted
community property laws during their 1947 sessions, so that the system now obtains in fourteen jurisdictions.' Four states have rejected community property
2
bills, while legislation is pending in four others.
Under the community property system, property of each spouse acquired
*LL. B., Dickinson School of Law; member of the Philadelphia Bar; Author, ESTATE PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING; Special Lecturer, Estate, Gift and Inheritance Taxes
Dickinson School of Law; frequent contributor to periodicals devoted to problems of Federal
taxation.
The author acknowledges the assistance of his office associate, Harry Yohlin, Esquire, of the
Philadelphia Bar; as well as that of Joanne Hirsch, Esquire, of the Pennsylvania Bar.
lArizona Code Annotated, Sec. 63-301 et seq. (R. S. 1901, Sec. 3104, as amended), California Civil
Code (1941), Sec. 161 et seq.; Idaho Code Annotated, Sec. 31-907; Louisiana Civil Code,
Art. 2332 et seq.; New Mexico Statutes Annotated (1941), Sec. 65-301 et seq.; Nevada Compiled Laws (1929), Sec. 3355 et seq., based on California Civil Code; Vernon's Texas Revised Civil Statutes, Art. 4619 et seq.; Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington, Sec. 6890
et seq.; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, Title 32, Sec. 66 et seq.; Oregon Laws, 1947, S. B.
210, effective July 5,.' 1947; Pennsylvania, Act of 1947, P. L. 384; Michigan: L. 1947, Pub.
Act 317, effective July 1, 1947; Nebraski,: L. 1947, Bill No. 410, effective Sept. 7, 1947;
Hawaii Laws, 1945, Series D-201: Act 273
2Rejected in Florida, Missouri, Wyoming and Indiana; pending in Alabama, New Hampshire,
Wisconsin and Illinois: Report of Research Institute of America, Legislative leaders of New
York State are also coasidering such legislation.
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after marriage, otherwise than by gift, descent or devise, is jointly owned by them.
Its origins which antedate the common law have been traced back to the rule of
the Goths in Spain in the fifth century A. D. when the women of the tribes fought
side by side with their husbands and it was felt that they were entitled to share
equally in the spoils of battle.8
The Spaniards who settled the southwestern part of the United States brought
the community property system with them. Eight states formed from this territory continued the system when they were admitted into the union. These states
are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas and
Washington.
The basic historical difference between the common law and community
property systems is the vesting in the wife of a one-half interest in community
property equal to that possessed by her husband. Furthermore, except in Nevada
and New Mexico, she has full power of testamentary disposition over her interest.
Thus, the adoption of the community property system by a common law state such
as Pennsylvania is in a sense a logical extension of the gradual, economic emancipation of women from their position of complete subservience under the common law. See, for example, the Act of May 17, 1945, P. L. 625, (48 P S 31, 32),
giving to married women the same rights to acquire and dispose of their property
as possessed by married men. That is, a married woman can contract without
restriction except that she still must have the joinder of her husband to convey
real property.
Although the adoption of the community property system might be justified
on the social philosophy, its extension into six common law jurisdictions (Oklahoma, Oregon, Nebraska, Michigan, Pennsylvania. and the Territory of Hawaii)
within the past eight years was motivated by the desire to save Federal taxes, an
effort which has been but partially successful.
The increased burden of Federal income surtax rates has stimulated efforts
on the part of taxpayers and their advisors to develop devices by which the weight
of such taxation could be reduced. In the forefront of such mechanisms has been
the trend towards the adoption of systems of community property in states whose
basic concept of property ownership stemmed from the common law. Recognizing the distinct income tax advantage which the residents of community property states enjoy by reason of the fact that spouses are permitted to divide between them the income of the community, these common law states have enacted
community property statutes to make available to their residents similar income
tax advantages.
Poe vs. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930, Washington) decided that where the
wife had under the appropriate state law a present, vested interest in the community property, each spouse could report one-half of the family income for Fed8

See De Funiak, Principles of Community Property, Sec. 2; McKay, Community Property, Sec. 9
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eral income tax, notwithstanding the statutory rights of the husband with respect
to the management, control and disposition of the property. This was so because he was regarded only as the "agent of the community" in exercising such
rights.
Until now, the device has been effective for income tax-saving purposes because of a line of Supreme Court decisions holding that the ownership of property is determined by state law. See, for example, Helvering vs. Stuart, 317 U. S.
154 (1942); and Blair vs. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937). It may be noted
here that this rationale conflicts with an equally recent and more realistic succession of decisions taxing income to the one who earns it, or controls it or has the
actual enjoyment of it: Lucas vs. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930); Helvering vs. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940); and Helvering vs. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940).
These two doctrines cannot be reconciled and their coexistence in tax law provides incongruous tax consequences.

THE PENNSYLVANIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY ACT
The basic provisions of the Pennsylvania Act may be summarized briefly:
1. Before September 1, 1947, the effective date of the Act, there was no
community property in Pennsylvania. Everything owned by spouses before that
date remains their separate property.
After September 1, 1947, any property acquired by either spouse other than
by gift, descent or devise or received as compensation for personal injuries is community property. See Sections 1-3 of Community Property Act.
2. Each spouse is to have the management, control and power of disposition of his or her separate property except real estate, as to which prior statutory
provisions with respect to joinder are still applicable (Act of June 8, 1893, P. L.
344, Sec. 1, 2, as amended by Act of May 17, 1945, P. L. 625, Sec. 1, 2, (48 P S
31, 32) ). In addition, the wife is to have the management, control and right of
disposition of community property economically attributable to her and community
property standing in her name. All other community property is subject to the
management, control and power of disposition of the husband: Sections 4 and 5
of Community Property Act.
Although the wife has certain statutory rights in the community property
economically attributable to the husband, she cannot obtain her interest in the
community until the' dissolution of the community, either by death or divorce. But
the husband, though his power of disposition over the community not under his
wife's control is unrestricted on paper, will probably be held subject to the limitation obtaining in Texas, where a husband cannot dispose of community property
in fraud of the wife: Locke vs. Locke, 143 S. W. 2d 637 (1940- Texas). The
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payment of taxes on his separate property out of community funds by the husband
has been held not to constitute a fraud against the wife: Ames vs. Ames, 188 S.
W. 2d 689, (Texas, 1945); but where a husband purchased a death benefit certificate with community funds, naming the wife as beneficiary, and then changed
the beneficiary, the attempt was held to be a fraud on the wife, so that the second
beneficiary named could recover only one-half of the proceeds of the certificate:
Allen vs. Brewster, 172 S. W. 2d 192 (Texas, 1943). Similarly, where a husband makes gifts to his mistress: Johnson vs. United States, 135 F. 2d 125
(CCA-9, 1943, California).
In California, the husband is prohibited by statute (Sec. 172 of the California
Civil Code) from making a gift of the community personal property without the
written consent of the wife, who can set aside such a gift with respect to her
undivided half interest after the death of the husband: Trimble vs. Trimble, 26
P. 2d 477 (California, 1933); and in its entirety during the lifetime of the husband: Britton vs. Hammell, 52 P. 2d 221 (California, 1935).
3. Under Section 9 of the Community Property Act, spouses are given the
right to deal between themselves with community property in esse, a conveyance
of community property to one of the spouses making it the separate property of
such spouse.
4. Upon the dissolution of the marriage by divorce, i.e., a decree a.v.m.,
since Pennsylvania does not regard a decree a.m.e.t. as dissolving the marriage
(see Freedman, Law of Marriage and Divorce in Pennsylvania, Sec. 705) each
spouse, is vested with an undivided one-half interest in the community property
as tenants in common: Section 10 of Community Property Act.
5. On the dissolution of the community by the death of either spouse, the
surviving spouse is to administer all the community property, paying the debts
of the community and then conveying one-half of the remainder to the executor
or administrator of the deceased spouse to be administered and distributed as
other property of the estate of the deceased spouse, either by will or under the
laws of descent and distribution. The surviving spouse may also act as the
executor or administrator of the deceased's estate: Section 15 of Community
Property Act.
6. Sections 7 and 8 of the Community Property Act protect the rights of
the creditors of each spouse against community property if debts are contracted
or torts committed in the management of such property.
7.

The Community Property Act also sets up certain presumptions:
a. Section 3: all property possessed by husband and wife
at the time of the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to
be community property.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

b. Section 6: funds on deposit in a bank in the name of
one spouse are presumed to be the separate property of that
spouse.
c. Section 7: all debts created by the husband or wife
after marriage or after the effective date of the Act are presumed to be community debts.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATUTES
Since Pennsylvania's Community Property Act is copied from the Oklahoma
Community Property Act, which in turn was modelled on the Texas statute, decisions from those states should be helpful as guides in construing the Pennsylvania Statute. There have been but few decisions under the Oklahoma Act,
which was re-enacted in 1945 after its first statute, allowing spouses to elect to
become subject to its terms, was held invalid for Federal income tax purposes:
Commissioner vs. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44 (1944). Therefore, a study of the
numerous cases decided under the Texas statute will be illuminating, always bearing in mind the differences between the Texas and Pennsylvania Acts.
Under the Texas community property statute, increase of lands acquired after
marriage by gift, devise or bequest remains the separate property of the spouse
acquiring the land: Fleming vs. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 301 (CCA-5, 1946);
Evans vs. Purinton, 34 S. W. 350, Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 1896 (profits
from sale of separate property of married women was separate property). Royalties from oil and gas leases which are the separate property of a Texas spouse
also remain separate property: Turbeville vs. Commissioner, 84 F. 2d 307 (CCA-5,

1936); Commissioner vs. Wilson, 76 F. 2d 766 (CCA-5, 1934). Rent from
separate property is community property, however: Commissioner vs. Wilson,
supra. In Pennsylvania, profits realized from the disposition of separate property
should similarly be held to be separate property of such spouse.
Texas, unlike Pennsylvania, requires the joinder of husband and wife to dispose of stocks and bonds, in addition to real estate,
The Pennsylvania Community Property Act differs in other particulars from
some provisions found in the several community property statutes. For instance,
income from separate property of either spouse is designated community property
under Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Act. It is also community property in Idaho
(Sec. 31-907 of Idaho Code Annotated); Louisiana (Sec. 2402 of Dart's Louisiana
Civil Code); Nebraska (L. 1947, L. B. 410; Sec. 4); Oklahoma (L. 1945, H.
218, Sec. 4); Oregon (L. 1947, Ch. 525, Sec. 4); and Texas (Vernon's Texas
Civil Statutes, Art. 4619). In the other community property jurisdictions, notably
California (Sec. 162, 163 of California Civil Code), income from the separate
property of a spouse remains separate property.
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Although in general, the wife has full power of disposition over her separate
property, her rights in the management, control and disposition of the community
property vary widely in the different jurisdictions. These rights range from the
liberal ones in the "Oklahoma group", i.e., Pennsylvania, Nebraska and Oregon,
which adopted the 1945 Oklahoma statute, to the narrowly restrictive provisions
of Louisiana and Texas.
Under Section 4 of the Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, and Oregon
statutes, the wife may freely dispose of the community property economically attributable to her, and of all community property standing in her name, subject
to joinder provisions in the sale or encumbrance of real estate. In the other community property jurisdictions, more control has been vested in the husband, as the
"agent of the community", such powers not being sufficient, however, to divest
the interest of the wife for Federal income tax purposes. See Poe vs. Seaborn,
282 U. S. 101 (1930, Washington).
In Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and Washington, the husband has the sole
and complete power of disposition over community personal property.4 This
right is subject to the statutory restriction under Sec. 2404 of the Louisiana Civil
Code that the husband may not make gifts of community personal property in
fraud of the wife, a restriction which has been read into the appropriate statute
by judicial construction. See Locke vs. Locke, 143 S. W. 2d 637 (1940, Texas),
a result which would probably be reached in Pennsylvania also under similar facts.
In California, the husband must have the written consent of the wife to make a
valid gift of community personal property: Sec. 172 of California Civil Code;
Britton vs. Hammil, 52 P. 2d 221 (California, 1935).
In Nevada and New Mexico, the wife has no power of testamentary disposition over her half of the community property. Although no express provision
as to testamentary disposition appears in the Pennsylvania Community Property
Act, provision is made in Section 15 for the transfer by the surviving spouse to
the executor or administrator of the deceased spouse's estate of one-half the community property remaining after payment of the debts of the community, such
half to be distributed as part of the estate of the deceased spouse or under the
intestate laws.

The wife must join in the conveyance of community real property or its
encumbrance in California, New Mexico, Nevada, Idaho, Washington and Penn-

sylvania. s
'Arizona Code Annotated, Sec. 63-301; New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Sec. 68-403; Vernon's
Texas Civil Statutes, Art. 4619; Remington's Washington Statutes, Sec. 6892
SCalifornia Civil Code. Sec. 172a; New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Sec. 68-403, Remington's
Washington Statutes, Sec. 6893; Nevada Compiled Laws, Sec. 3360 (homestead only); Idaho
Code Annotated, Sec. 31-913; Pennsylvania Community Property Act, Sec. 5
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DOMICILE
Since only the residents of a community property state may take advantage
of its laws, a determination of the domicile of a taxpayer must be made in some
cases to determine the applicable law. The taxpayer must be an actual resident
of the community property state at the time when the income was earned, and
must intend to remain there. See Rogers Hornsby, 26 BTA 591 (Texas, 1932);
Kastel vs. Commissioner, 136 F. 2d 530 (CCA-5, Texas, 1943). For a discussion of the elements entering into a determination of domicile, see Mertens,
Law of Federal Income Taxation, Vol. 3, Sec. 19.31.
In Skilkret vs. Helvering, 138 F. 2d 925 (Ct. of App., D. C., 1943) it was
held that money earned in California by a taxpayer domiciled in another state
was not community income; while in Eddy R. McDuif, 3 TCM 882 (1944, Texas)
the taxpayer was found to have retained his domicile in a community property state
although he had been working for five years in another state because the job was
supposed to be a temporary one and there was clear evidence of intent to retain
the Texas domicile.
The question of domicile in connection with community property has arisen
most frequently with respect to two factual situations: the holding of property in
a non-community property state by spouses domiciled in a community property
state; and change of domicile to or from a non-community property jurisdiction.
General principles of conflict of laws are applicable in both instances, namely,
that the community property law of a state operates with respect to land situated within its bounds, even though held by non-residents; and to all personal
property owned by spouses domiciled within the state. Thus, the earnings of a
spouse domiciled in Pennsylvania and working in New Jersey are community
property, whereas the Pennsylvania Community Property Act would not apply to
the earnings of a New Jersey resident employed in Pennsylvania. See I. T. 1268,
C. B. June 1922, p. 234; 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, pp, 952-953; Black vs. Commissioner, 114 F. 2d 355 (CCA-9, 1940, Washington), where a husband and
wife domiciled in a non-community property state agreed to hold real estate in a
community property state in community, each reporting one-half of the income,
and the agreement was held effective for purposes of the Federal income tax.
When spouses change their domicile, whether from a community property
state to a non-community property state or vice versa, the income is prorated. That
earned in the community property state is reportable half by each spouse, while
that earned in the non-community property state must be reported by its earner:
Wrightsman vs. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 227 (CCA-5, 1940, Texas); 0. D. 810,
C. B. June 1921, p. 235.
In David L. Loew, 7 TC 363 (1946, California), income earned by a taxpayer domiciled in a non-community property state prior to his change of domicile
to a community property state was not community income; while in Fooshe vs.
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Commissioner, 132 F. 2d 686 (CCA-9, California, 1942), it was held that income earned in a community property state but not paid until after the taxpayer
had moved to a non-community property state was still community income divisible between the spouses.
The law of the situs of real property determines the character of income
derived from it as community or non-community. Thus, spouses domiciled in a
non-community property state who received income from property situated in a
community property state could each report one-half of the income, such income
being community property: Hammonds vs. Commissioner, 106 F. 2d 420
(CCA-L0, 1939, Oklahoma; Texas property); Commissioner vs. Skaggs, 122 F.
2d 721 (CCA-5, 1941, Texas): income from California property acquired by a
Texas resident was not community property, the law of the situs controlling as to
whether income from separate property was separate or community and it was
separate under the law of California. See also W. D. Johnson,. I TC 1041
(1943, Mo.).
In Estate of Angus P. Malloy, 28 BTA 716 (1933, Washington), the husband purchased property in a community property state with capital earned in a
common law state before acquiring domicile in the community property state. The
property itself was held to have remained his separate property.
NECESSITY FOR VALID MARRIAGE
The existence of a valid marriage is essential before spouses can take advantage of the tax benefits of the community property system. Since common
law marriages are recognized in Pennsylvania, parties to such a marriage would
be entitled to file separate returns on community income.
Where spouses are not living together but the marriage has not been dissolved, the domicilk of the husband determines that of the wife for the applicability of the community property acts. Thus, income from community property
in Texas was still community income where the husband, who was non compos
mentis, resided in Texas and the wife in Virginia: 0. D. 1023, C. B. Dec. 1921,
p. 196; S. M. 4297, C. B. Dec. 1925, p. 130.
Where the wife was a non-resident alien living separate from her husband
but the marriage had not been dissolved, income earned by him in a community
property state was held to be community income, reportable one-half by each
spouse: Commissioner vs. Cavanagh, 125 F. 2d 366 (CCA-9, 1942, California);
Herbert Marshall, 41 BTA 1064 (1940, California).
Conversely, where the wife was resident in a community property state
(Texas), and the husband was not, Ohio being his and the matrimonial domicile,
her income was not community income: Payne vs. Commissioner, 141 F. 2d 398
(CCA-5, 1944, Texas).
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Since only a divorce a.v.m. terminates a marriage in Pennsylvania (see Freedman, Law of Marriage and Divorce in Pennsylvania, Sec. 705), income earned
following a divorce a.m.e.t. would be reportable by both spouses as community
income.
Where the husband's right to compensation arose during the marriage but
was not paid until after his death, it was community property: Commissioner vs.
King, 69 F. 2d 639 (CCA-5, 1934, Texas); but fees earned by a surviving spouse
as executrix of her husband's estate were not community property because the
death of the husband terminated the community: S. M. 4623, IV-2, C. B. 40.
GENERAL INCOME TAX IMPLICATIONS
a.

-

Returns

If spouses file on the long form 1040, each will report income from his
separate property plus one-half the sum of the community income. Should the
taxable income of either or both be less than $5,000, the short form 1040 may
be used. Spouses may use Form W-2 only if their combined gross income is less
than $5,000 and their combined income not subject to withholding is less than
$100. Declarations of estimated tax are still required under the appropriate
circumstances (income from wages subject to withholding in excess of $5,000
a year, or gross income of $500 or more and more than $100 income not subject
to withholding).

b. - Gross Income
The gross income which may be divided equally between the spouses will
consist of the income from the separate property and personal services of each
spouse, and the income from community property: Section 4 of the Pennsylvania
Community Property Act. It is thus unnecessary to consider the problem in
Pennsylvania of the ownership of income from separate property. See, for example, Shea vs. Commissioner, 81 F. 2d 937 (CCA-9, California, 1936); W. D.
Johnson, I TC 1041 (1943) (Missouri, property in Texas).
The following items have been held to constitute community property in
Texas and should be similarly treated in Pennsylvania:
Interest on the husband's separate bank account: Oscar Chesson, 22 BTA
818, affirmed 57 F. 2d 141 (CCA-5, 1932).
Income from property devised to spouse during marriage: Commissioner
vs. Terry, 69 F. 2d 969 (CCA-5, 1934).
Income from an inter vivos trust: Commissioner vs. Wilson, 76 F. 2d 766
(CCA-5, 1935).
c. - Capital Gains and Losses
The treatment of this item depends upon whether the property sold is community property or the separate property of one of the spouses.
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If it is community property, that is, acquired after September 1, 1947 with
community income, the gain or loss is to be divided equally between the spouses:
Bishop vs. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 389 (CCA-9, California, 1945).
If the property is separate property, purchased with separate funds, the spouse
must report the entire gain or deduct the entire loss in his or her separate return:
Fleming vs. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 361 (CCA-5, Texas, 1946).
Where capital stock was the separate property of the husband and its increase in value was not due in any way to the efforts of the community, the increase in value did not fall into the community even though the corporation was
controlled by the husband and his family: Beals vs. Fontenot, ill F. 2d 956
(CCA-5, Louisiana, 1940); Commissioner vs. Skaggs, 122 F. 2d 721 (CCA-5,
1941, Texas). The profit from the sale of war bonds was similarly treated in
O'Connor vs. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 652 (CCA-5, 1940, Texas).
In W. T. Carter, Jr., 36 BTA 853 (1937, Texas), the increase in the value of
stock was found to have been due to the efforts of the husband, so that the increase was community property. Similarly, where it was found that the decedent
was adequately compensated for his services, increment in the value of corporate
stock was held to be community property: Gump vs. Commissioner, 124 F. 2d
540 (CCA-9, 1941, California); cert. den., 316 U. S. 697 (1942).
d. -

Income from Trust Estates

Pennsylvania comes under the rule that in the community property states in
which income from separate property is community property, income from a trust
is community income where the beneficiary resided in a community property state,
even though the trust was not created in that state and the trust corpus was not
located there: Commissioner vs. Porter, 148 F. 2d 566 (CCA-5, 1945, Texas);
Commissioner vs. Sims, 148 F. 2d 574 (CCA-5, 1945, Texas); Commissioner
vs. Snowden, 148 F. 2d 569 (CCA-5, Texas, 1945).
e. -

Income From Partnerships

In Pennsylvania, the income from a partnership is community income whether the property invested in the partnership is separate or community. Thus, cases
dealing with the ownership of income from separate property or with the allocation of income between capital and services to separate and community property
do not arise under the Pennsylvania Community Property Act, regardless of
uhether the business of the husband is a partnership or sole proprietorship. This
is so because income from the capital will be community property, even though it
was the separate property of one spouse.
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ALLOCATION OF INCOME TO PERIODS BEFORE AND AFTER
EFFECTIVE DATE OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATUTE
A problem which will arise under the Pennsylvania Community Property Act,
however, is that of the allocation of both income from sole proprietorships and
partnerships before and after September 1, 1947. See, I. T. 3792, C. B. 1946-1
dealing with this question under the Hawaiian Community Property Law, which
is similar to Pennsylvania's in that income from separate property is community
property which requires allocation of income before and after the effective date
of the Statute.
The test is, when the income was earned, not when it was paid. Thus, income earned before September 1, 1947 must be reported by the spouse actually
earning it, regardless of the date when the compensation was received. See
Wrightsman vs. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 227 (CCA-5, 1940, Texas).

In a partnership on a cash basis, income representing partnership net earnings for the period after the effective date of the act is community income; for
the period before September 1, 1947, the income would be the separate income
of the spouse receiving it. Where the partnership is on an accrual basis, it would
seem that income earned before the effective date of the Act, no matter when
paid or distributed, would be separate income. See Albin Johnson, TC Memo.
Op., CCH Dec. 15, 666 (M) (1947) (Washington).
In California and the other jurisdictions, in which income from separate
property remains the separate property of the spouse earning it, an allocation
must be made in the case of partnership income between that attributable to the
personal services of the spouse, which is community income, and that attributable
to the separate capital of the spouse, which remains the separate income of that
spouse. See G. C. M. 9825, C. B. X-2, p. 146, giving the formula for allocation
and apportionment in the case of a California partnership in which the husband
was a partner and the wife was not; also Shea vs. Commissioner, !81 F. 2d 937
(CCA.9, California, 1936); and WV. D. Johnson, 1 TC 1041 (1943 Mo., Texas
property); George WV. Van Vorst, 7 TC 826 (1947, California).
INCOME DURING ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE
There are two lines of decisions on the question of whether community income is divisible between the surviving spouse and the estate of the deceased
spouse while the estate is being administered. The rule in Washington is that
such income is taxable entirely to the estate, the reason being that the executor
takes title to all of the community property on the death of the husband, all of it
being subject to administration: Commissioner vs. Larson, 131 F. 2d 85 (CCA-9,
1942).
The opposite result was reached in California in Bishop vs. Commissioner,
152 F. 2d 389 (CCA-9, 1945). There, the income was held divisible between
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the surviving spouse and the estate of the deceased spouse because the personal
representative does not take title to the community property. The same result
has been reached under Louisiana Law in Henderson's Estate vs. Commissioner,
155 F. 2d 310 (CCA-5, 1946); and will be followed with respect to Idaho
spouses, under which law the wife on the death of the husband takes one-half of
the community property as a matter of right, not by descent: 1. T. 3861 (1947).
It seems probable that Pennsylvania will also follow the Bishop case, since the
surviving spouse has only the power to administer the community property until
the payment of debts, after which one-half is to be transferred to the estate of the
deceased spouse: Section 15 of Pennsylvania Community Property Act.
BASIS OF PROPERTY
I. T. 3862 (1947) deals with the basis of community property where it is
sold by the executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased spouse. With
respect to the widow's half interest, the adjusted basis is to be the cost or other
basis of such share to the community, while the basis of the half interest of the
deceased spouse is to be the fair market value at the date of the death of the

spouse.
DEDUCTIONS
If the deduction is incident to the production of community income, it may
be divided equally between the spouses: Stewart vs. Commissioner, 95 F. 2d 821
(CCA-5, 1938, Texas).
If the deduction is not attributable to community property or to the production of community income, it is to be taken separately by each spouse: Irma
Jones Hunt, 47 BTA 829 (1942, Texas). In this case, it was held that taxes,
attorneys' fees and interest paid by a Texas wife with respect to her separate
property were deductible by her alone when the property had produced no income
during the taxable year, even though the income, had there been any, would have
been community property. Since the Commissioner has not acquiesced in this
decision (N. A. 1943-1-C. B. 33), the rule may be limited to the particular facts
in the case.
Where the community incurred an obligation which was paid by the tax.
payer and the estate of her deceased husband, she was entitled to deduct from
her income one-half of the amount paid as a bad debt: Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43
BTA 277 (1941, Texas).
But the wife was not entitled to deduct as her share in a community debt
one-half of the settlement of a lawsuit by her husband where the misfeasance
occurred before the husband and wife had acquired their domicile in a community property state: LottiO Zukor, 43 BTA 825 (1941, California).
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State sales and excise taxes are deductible half by each spouse only if paid
out of community funds: see Bishop vs. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 389 (CCA-9,
1945, California).
The same rule applies to the deduction for medical expenses, which are deductible by the spouse paying them. Thus, if paid out of separate funds, the
deduction could be taken only by the spouse paying the expenses, but the de°duction may be divided if paid out of community funds: Ernest W. Clemens,
8 TC 121 (1947, Texas).
Charitable contributions are deductible by each spouse only if it can be
shown that the payment was made with community funds and with the approval
of both spouses: Stewart vs. Commissioner, 95 F. 2d 821, (CCA-5, 1938, Texas);
Ernest W. Clemens, supra.

DEPENDENTS
The credit for dependents cannot be divided between the spouses but must
be taken in its entirety for each dependent by either one or the other: I. T. 1275,
I-1, C. B. 201. If there is more than one, however, it would appear that each
spouse could claim one or more if the dependent were supported entirely from
community funds.
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPOUSES AFFECTING
OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
Several community property states permit spouses to enter into agreements
which change the character of the ownership of property during the marital
status. The agreement may either provide for the transmutation of the separate
property of either spouse into community property and vice versa; or it may be
prospective in its operation providing, in effect, that the income of each spouse
shall continue to remain his or her separate property, as though the community
property statute was non-existent. An agreement of this type permits the parties
to "elect out" of the community property statutes.
Where local law permits such agreements between spouses, they will be
recognized for income tax purposes, provided they do not constitute assignments
of future income under the prohibition of Lucas vs. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930).

See Johnson vs. United States, 135 F. 2d 125 (CCA-9, 1943, California); Boland
vs. Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 622 (CCA-9, 1941, California); I. T. 3792, 1946-1
C. B. 86. Thus, it has been held where spouses agreed that their individual
earnings should remain their separate property, each spouse was taxable on his
or her earnings in their entirety: Van Dyke vs. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 945
(CCA-9, 1941, California); Helvering vs. Hickman, 70 F. 2d 985 (CCA-9,
1934, California); Claire vs. United States, 34 F. Supp. 1009 (Ct. Cl., 1940,
California).
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California is a notable example of a community property state where parties
may by agreements, either oral or written, change the character of the ownership
of property. Thus, it has been held that parties may agree that the earnings of
either spouse shall remain the separate property of such spouse: Helvering vs.
Hickman, supra; Claire vs. United States, supra. Similarly, agreements may
provide that the separate property of either spouse shall become community property: Yoakum vs. Kingery, 58 Pac. 324 (1899, California); Samuel S. Berger,
BTA Memo. op. 11, 290-E (1940, California). Conversely, community property may be transmuted into separate property. Other states which permit agreements to the extent recognized in California are Idaho (Ahistrom vs. Tage, 174
Pac. 605 (1918, Idaho) ); Nevada (Stockgrowers and Ranchers Bank vs. Milisich,
283 Pac. 913 (1930, Nevada)); Arizona (Martha Locke Shoenhair, 45 BTA
576 (1941, Arizona)); Washington (Gage vs. Gage, 138 Pac. 886 (1914, Washington), Black vs. Commissioner, 114 F. 2d 355 (CCA-9, 1940, Washington));
Hawaii (I. T. 3792, 1946-1 C. B. 86).
The states of Louisiana and New Mexico, however, hold that the husband
and wife cannot change the character of the ownership of property by agreement during marriage: Guillot vs. Guillot, 74 So. 704 (1917, Louisiana);
McDonald vs. Lambert, 85 P. 2d 78 (1938, New Mexico).
Texas has adopted a position somewhat in between these two extremes. It
permits agreements between spouses transmuting the character of their ownership of property in existence. Thus, community property in existence may, by
agreement, be converted into separate property and vice versa: Marrs McLean,
41 BTA 565 (1940, Texas); Stewart vs. Commissioner, 95 F. 2d 821 (CCA-5,
1938, Texas). However, agreements may not be entered into with respect to
property not presently in existence. Thus, future earnings of either spouse or
future income from the separate property of either spouse may not, by agreement, be changed into the separate property of the earning spouse: Stewart vs.
Commissioner, supra.
There are no decisions on these questions with respect to the community
property statutes operative in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. Both statutes, as
has been previously indicated, are modeled to a large extent after the Texas
satute.
The community property statutes of Oklahoma and Pennsylvania provide
"the husband may give, grant, bargain, sell, or convey directly to his wife, and
a wife may give, grant, bargain, sell, or convey directly to her husband his or
her community property in esse. Every deed and conveyance made from the
husband to the wife or from the wife to the husband shall operate to divest the
property therein described of every claim or demand as community property to
the extent herein provided and shall vest the same in the grantee as the separate
property of the grantee, provided, however, that the deeds, conveyances, or trans-
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fers hereby authorized shall not affect any existing equity in favor of creditors
of the grantor at the time of such transfer, gift, or encumbrance.": Section 9,
Pennsylvania Community Property Act; Oklahoma Community Property Act.
The reference in this provision to property "in esse" would seem to preclude
agreements affecting the future earnings or income of the parties. Thus, it may
well be held that in Pennsylvania, as in Texas, parties may not, by agreement,
change the character of the ownership of property not in existence.
The question may be raised as to the effect of this provision on ante-nuptial
agreements. Can ante-nuptial agreements hereafter provide that property acquired by spouses after marriage, which would normally be community property,
shall continue to remain the separate property of the earning spouse, as it was
prior to the effective date of the community property statute? It may be argued
that, since Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Statute permits transactions between
spouses only with respect to property "in esse", ante-nuptial agreements cannot
alter the rights of the parties in community property arising thereafter. On the
other hand, the policy of the law, certainly in Pennsylvania, which has regarded
with favor ante-nuptial agreements entered into under certain circumstances may
be construed to be of such compelling force that this provision will be held not
to affect such agreements entered into between the parties before the marital
status has been established. Moreover, it is to be noted that Section 9 deals
speiifically with transactions between husband and wife and does not by its terms
cover pre-nuptial agreements.
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
The rules applicable with respect to agreements generally would be equally
applicable in respect of separation agreements. Thus, California and the other
states (see above), which have liberal rules concerning agreements, permit parties
to enter into separation agreements, dividing the community property between
them and providing that the future earnings of each spouse shall remain separate.
Boland vs. Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 622 (CCA-9, 1941, California); Beard vs.
Beard, 24 P. 2d 47 (1933, Idaho); Parsonsvs. Tracy, 220 P. 813 (1923, Washington). Louisiana, on the other hand, does not allow the dissolution of the
community by a separation agreement: Guillot vs. Guillot, 74 So. 704 (Louisiana,
1917).
Texas, although it recognizes separation agreements which deal with existing community property, does not permit the division of community property
not in existence. Thus, despite the fact that the spouses have separated and have
divided the community property between them, future earnings of either spouse,
as well as the income from the separate property of either, will continue to remain community property. G. C. M. 10941 X1-2 C. B. 223.
As for Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, the previous discussion with respect to
agreements generally is equally applicable here.
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FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX IMPLICATIONS
Much emphasis has been placed upon the Federal income tax advantages to
residents of Community Property States. Less attention has been directed to the
Federal Estate and Gift tax implications which, in some instances, minimize or
overcome the income tax advantages.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX

Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942, effective as to decedents dying after October 21, 1942, recognition had been given to the vested interest of each spouse
in one-half of the community property, so that only such half was included in
the estate of the spouse who was the first to die. Thus, where the community

property had been largely amassed through the efforts of one spouse and that
spouse died first, the decedent's estate paid Federal estate tax only on the value
of one-half of the community property. As a result, an Estate tax saving was

enjoyed which became substantial in the higher brackets.

See, Report of the

House Committee on Ways and Means, H. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 35-37; and of the Senate Committee on Finance, S. Rep. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 231.
Legislative efforts to offset this estate tax advantage have met with greater
success than in the income tax field.
The Revenue Act of 1942 added Sections 811 (e) (2), 811 (g) (4) and
811 (d) (5) to the Internal Revenue Code with the express purpose of eliminating the preferential treatment enjoyed by spouses residing in the community
property states. These changes were made effective as to decedents dying after
October 21, 1942.
The amendments made by Section 402 of the Revenue Act of 1942, which
became section 811 (e) (2) of the Code, established a new test for the inclusion
of community property in the gross estate of a decedent resident in a community
property state. It provided that all community property shall be includible in
the gross estate in its entirety except for such part ". . . as may be shown to have
been received as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse or derived originally from such compensation or from separate property of the surviving spouse". The test of taxibility is-to whom is the property
economically attributable? Property is considered to be economically attributable to
a spouse if such spouse can show that it was derived from his or her personal services or separate property; or that it was originally his or her separate property which
was transferred to the community; or that the property was purchased with income from such personal services or from separate property. The entire community property is presumed to belong to the spouse who is the first to die. The
surviving spouse has the burden of proving that the community property was
economically attributable to him or her before it will be excluded from the estate
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of the deceased spouse. To the extent only that the surviving spouse successfully
meets this burden will such community property escape Federal estate taxation.
In taxing the whole of the community property in the estate of the first
spouse to die, to the extent that it is economically attributable to such spouse,
the 1942 amendment disregards the vested interest in the community property
given to each spouse under state law, which has been recognized for income tax
purposes: Poe vs. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930). State law is recognized, however, to the benefit of the Treasury, by the further provision that in no event
shall there be included in the gross estate of the decedent "less than the value of
such part of the community property as was subject to the decedent's power of
testamentary disposition": Section 811 (e) (2) 1. R. C. This latter is half of
the community property in every jurisdiction except Nevada and New Mexico,
vihere the wife has no power of testamentary disposition over her interest in the
community property. Logically, then, it would seem that in, those states no estate
tax should be assessed against the estate of a wife dying first with respect to hef
interest in community property which was not economically attributable to her.
The two factual situations which will arise under Section 811 (e) (2) of
the Code are the prior death of (a) the earning spouse, and (b) the non-earning
spouse. In the first case, all of the community property may be included in the
estate of the spouse, the burden being on the surviving spouse to show any property economically attributable to him or her. In the second case, at least one-half
of the community property will be included in the estate of the deceased spouse
regardless of who earned it.
The use of the double barrelled test - that of economic source where the
earning spouse is the first to die, and power of testamentary disposition where
the non-earning spouse dies first, has been criticized as discriminatory and inequitable. 45 Michigan Law Review 409 (February, 1947); Application of Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Laws to Community Property - Willard S.
Pederson. Actually, it is a realistic attempt to equalize the tax burden between
residents of community and non-community states. Otherwise, as has been previously indicated, residents of community property states would enjoy a distinct
estate tax advantage.
The taxation of the whole community property in the estate of a decedent
to whom it is economically attributable is justifiable on the ground that he is the
economic source of the property. A similar test has been applied with respect
to the taxation of tenancies by the entireties and joint tenancies. United
States vs, Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363 (1939). Furthermore, death brings about important changes in the rights of the parties in community property. It terminates
the control which the decedent, assuming he is the husband, exercised over the
entire property during his lifetime and for the first time brings the wife's share
of the property into her full and exclusive possession, control and enjoyment.
"The cessation of these extensive powers of the husband, even though they were
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powers over property which he never 'owned', and the establishment in the wife
of new powers of control over her share, though it was always hers, furnish appropriate occasions for the imposition of an excise tax." Fernandez vs. Wiener,
326 U. S. 340 (1945).
It is equally just to tax one-half of the community property in the estate of
the non-earning spouse (assuming it is the wife) in the event she should die first.
The power to dispose of property at death has always been regarded as one of
the important criteria for determining the includibility of property in the gross
estate of a decedent. See Section 811 (c), (d) and (f) of the Internal Revenue
Code, dealing generally with powers held or retained under inter vivos transfers
to affect the disposition of property at death. To persons of wealth, power to
disposd of property is often more important than the power to consume.
Furthermore, if the test for taxability were economic source alone, so that
nothing would be taxable in the estate of the non-earning wife should she die
first, residents in community property states would continue to enjoy a substantial
tax advantage. Assuming the non-earning wife were the first to die, leaving
her half of the community property to her children, this half would pass to them
untaxed. Thereafter, when the husband, the earning spouse, would die, only
one-half of the c6mmunity property would be taxable in his estate, since that is
all that would remain in his possession and control. Such a result would be
even more advantageous to residents of community property states than the
former method of Federal estate taxation, under which half was taxable in the
estate of each spouse, so that eventually the whole estate was subjected to the tax.
The constitutionality of Section 811 (e) (2) of the Code has been sustained by the Supreme Court in the cases of Fernandez vs. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340
(1945, Louisiana); and United States vs. Rompel, 326 U. S. 367 (1945, Texas),
in both of which cases the husband had died first and the entire community
property was held includible in his gross estate because none was economically
attributable to the surviving spouse.
In Fernandez vs. Wiener, supra, the deceased spouse was a resident of
Louisiana. It was sought to exclude from his gross estate one-half of the community property, none of which was economically attributable to the surviving
spouse. The Court held that all of the property was properly includible in
his gross estate under Section 811 (e) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code; that
the death of the husband operated to transfer to the wife under Louisiana law
the control which he had exercised over her interest in the community during
his lifetime. The Federal estate tax being an excise tax, the termination of the
husband's control and its establishment in the surviving spouse were held to
create a proper occasion for the imposition of such a tax. In this situation, the
estate tax incidence is the same as in the non-community property states. By
way of dicta, the Court also pointed out that the death of the wife effected a
taxable transfer to the husband by releasing certain restrictions over his right to
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dispose of the community property. Even though the interests of the spouses
were vested, the changed relationship brought about by the death of either spouse
was held sufficient to justify the imposition of an estate tax.
In United States vs. Rompel, supra, the application of the same statute to
the estate of a Texas spouse was upheld. The following extract from the opinion gives the rationale for the decisions in both cases: "The death of either the
husband or the wife of the Texas community thus effects sufficient alteration
in the spouses' possession and enjoyment and reciprocal powers of control and
disposition of the community property as to warrant the imposition of an excise
tax measured by the value of the entire community." (326 U. S. at p. 370).
Of course, under the statute, any portion of the community economically attributable to the surviving spouse would be excluded from the gross estate of the
deceased spouse, with the limitation that in no event would there be included
in the decedent's estate less than one-half.
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS

There is a presumption that the entire community property in a decedent's
estate originated with the decedent, and it is the burden of the executor or administrator to prove by convincing evidence what portion thereof was economically attributable to the survivor. For this reason, it is advisable for the spouses
to keep clear records, segregating separate property and indicating the origin
of community property. In the absence of adequate proof, it may result that
the community property would be included in the decedent's estate, although it
actually was economically attributable to the survivor.
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS

Under Section 811 (g) of the Internal Revenue Code, life insurance proceeds are includible in the gross estate of a decedent for Federal estate tax purposes where the decedent paid the premiums directly or indirectly or possessed
at the date of death any incident of ownership in the policy.
Section 811 (g) (4), added by Section 404 of the Revenue Act of 1942,
provides that premiums paid out of community funds shall be deemed to have
been paid by the insured, except for that portion which may be shown to have
been received as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the
surviving spouse or derived originally from such compensation or from separate
property of the surviving spouse.
The section further provides that the term "incidents of ownership" includes incidents of ownership possessed by the decedent at his death as manager
of the community.
The constitutionality of this provision has recently been upheld: Fernandez
vs. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340 (1945). Thus, it becomes obvious that the source
of premium payments should be clearly indicated and records to establish it
carefully preserved.
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TRANSFER OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

Under Sections 811 (c) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code, there is
includible in the decedent's gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes property
which the decedent has transferred in contemplation of or to take effect at death,
and property which the decedent transferred in trust but over which he retained
a power to amend, alter, revoke or terminate. With respect to such transfers,
Section 811 (d) (5), added by Section 402 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1942
and which is applicable to Sections 811 (c)

and (d),

provides that ".

.

. a

transfer of property held as community property by the decedent and surviving
spouse . . . shall be considered to have been made by the decedent, except such

part thereof as may be shown to have been received as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse or derived originally
from such compensation or from separate property of the surviving spouse."
This provision was apparently designed to meet the situation where spouses
resident in community property states make such transfers to third parties. However, it may have inadvertently resulted in a loophole whereby a non-earning
spouse may release her interest in the community property, in contemplation of
death, thus avoiding the taxation of her one-half interest therein at death.
Section 811 (d) (5) in effect states that a transfer of community property in
contemplation of death shall be considered a transfer by a decedent only to the
extent that it is economically attributable to him. If the wife is the non-earning
spouse and she releases her interest, it would seem that such a transfer would be
excluded from the operation of section 811 (c) or (d). It may well be held,
however, that such a literal interpretation of the statute violates the spirit of section
811 (c) and such transfer will nevertheless be taxable.
Furthermore, a release by a non-earning spouse might be construed as a
release of a power over property sufficiently similar in its' legal attributes to a
power of appointment so as to bring it within the purview of Section 811 (f)
of the Code which provides for the taxation of powers of appointment released
in contemplation of death.
PENNSYLVANIA

STATE INHERITANCE TAX

Where husband and wife hold property jointly with rights of survivorship,
or as tenants by the entireties, such property is exempt from the Pennsylvania
TI'ansfer Inheritance Tax. Article 1, Section 1 (e), Act of June 20, 1919 P. L.
521 as amended by Act of June 22, 1931, P. L. 690 and July 14, 1936, P. L. 44,
(72 P S 2301). Would community property fall within this provision to exclude it entirely from such taxation? The primary difference between property
held by the community and property held by the entireties is that community
property does not entail rights of survivorship. Thus, it would seem that the
interest of the decedent in community property would not be exempt from the
Pennsylvania Transfer Inheritance Tax.
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THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX

Section 453 of the Revenue Act of 1942, effective January 1, 1943, added
Section 1000 (d) to the Internal Revenue Code, dealing with gifts of community
property. Previously, gifts of community property were taxed one-half to each
spouse, enabling them to take advantage of lower tax brackets: Letter of Deputy
Commissioner, November 22, 1935, CCH Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reporter,
Paragraph 3935.21. Beginning with the calendar year of 1943, such gifts were
presumed to be the gifts of the husband except insofar as the wife could prove
that they were economically attributable to her or, in the words of the statute,
were ".

.

. shown to have been received as compensation for personal services

actually rendered by the wife or derived originally from such compensation or
from separate property of the wife..." . To that extent only was it a gift by
the wife, enabling the spouses to reduce the gift tax applicable to the transfer.
Section 86.2 of Regulations 108 provides examples of donative transfers
by and between spouses which will be subject to a gift tax:
1. A gift of community property to a third party or parties.
2. A division of community property between a husband and wife into
the separate property of either.
3. A transfer by a husband and wife of community property into the
separate property of either or into a joint estate with rights of survivorship or a
tenancy by the entirety of both spouses. In all of these cases, however, it would
seem that property economically attributable to the donee would be excluded
so as to avoid the reductio ad absurdum of paying a gift tax on a transfer of
one's own property to oneself. A gift is commonly defined as the transfer of
one's property to another, so that where the donee retains the beneficial interest,
there can be no gift of that interest.
The Supreme Court has not as yet passed upon the constitutionality of this
amendment, but in view of the rationale of the decisions in Fernandez vs. Wiener,
326 U. S. 340 (1945, Louisiana) and United States vs. Rompel, 326 U. S. 367
(1945, Texas), in which the incidents of ownership released on, the death of a
spouse were held to effect a transfer of property sufficient to justify the imposition of an estate tax on all community property economically attributable to the
deceased spouse, it would seem highly probable that its validity will be upheld
when and if it reaches the Supreme Court. An additional factor is the expressed
Congressional intent to eliminate the favorable position enjoyed by spouses
resident in community property states, which was approved as to the Federal
estate tax in the Wiener and Rompel cases.
The Tax Court, in Charles I. Francis, 8 TC 822 (1947, Texas) recently relied
upon the philosophy of the Supreme Court in the Wiener case in upholding the
constitutionality of Section 1000 (d) in the case of a gift of war bonds eco.
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nomically attributable to the husband but held as community property by Texas
spouses. The vested interest of -the wife was not considered to be a sufficient
factor to prevent the imposition of a gift tax against the husband on the full
value of the bonds. Rather, the decision went on the sole power of the husband,
during coverture, to dispose of community property, the exercise of this power
being regarded by the Tax Court as the proper subject of an excise tax. G. H.
Beavers, TC Memo. CCH Dec. 15, 756 (M) (1947, Texas) also followed the
Francis case in upholding the constitutionality of Section 1000 (d).
CONFLICT BETWEEN INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION

OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
As will be noted from the above discussion, the Supreme Court has followed two diametrically opposed lines of reasoning with respect to the taxation
of community property. In Poe vs. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930, Washington),
the vested interest which each spouse held in the community property was the
determining factor in permitting each to report one-half of the community income. Hence, the test used was the "ownership" of the community interest
by each spouse. That the husband had extensive powers of control over the
community property was held not to be decisive.
In the case of the gift and estate taxes, the economic source of the community property is the test regardless of the vested interest which both spouses
possess in the property, the incidence of tax will depend on its economic source
except in the situation where the non-earning spouse is the first to die.
SITUATIONS WHICH MAY ARISE FROM 1942 AMENDMENT

Some rather anomalous results may follow from the 1942 amendment to
the gift tax, bearing in mind the provisions of the Regulations as summarized
above.
Thus, if the husband makes a gift of community property to the wife, it is
taxable entirely to him if none is economically attributable to her, even though
she has a vested interest in one-half of it.
On the other hand, if the wife transfers community property to the husband,
none of which is economically attributable to her, there is no resultant gift tax
liability, even though she has a vested interest in one-half of the property so
transferred.
If the husband makes a gift which is voidable by the wife, either because
she has not consented (see Sec. 172a of California Civil Code) or because it was
made in fraud of her interest, the gift would appear to be incomplete by reason
of her power to revoke or have it set aside, so that no gift tax could be assessed.
See Sanford vs. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939).
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No taxable gift results form a transfer of separate into comnmnity property: Regulations 108, Section 86.2.
A taxable gift results from a transfer by the husband of separate or community property, economically attributable to him, to a third person to be conveyed to the spouses as joint tenants.
It is evident from the above situations which may result from the application of Section 1000 (d) that the tracing of the economic origins of community
property will become an increasingly important and complex problem in all aspects of tax law. The 1942 amendments to the Federal estate and gift tax
statutes also show an increasing tendency to look to the economic realities of the
community property system, rather than to its technical refinements of title and
ownership under state law, by levying the excise tax on the spouse to whom the
property is economically attributable.
CONCLUSION
The present treatment of income of husband and wife for Federal income
tax purposes creates a patent, geographical inequality between residents of community and non-community property states. This condition is unsupportable
under any theory of taxation. The recent trend of common law states towards
the adoption of the community property system is motivated solely by the desire to give its citizens the benefit of income tax savings. The proper solution,
in order to remove this discrimination, is national legislation which would provide the same tax benefits available to husband and wife in community property
states to residents of all states. Several such plans have been proposed and although Congress thus far has defeated all efforts in this direction, it is highly
probable that the next session of the Congress will see the adoption of a solution.
The plan that has received the most favorable comment and which is apparently
acceptable to the Treasury Department is to allow husband and wife in all states
to total their income, divide this total between them and permit each to report
one-half. See, Family, Income and Federal Taxation by Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Legislative Counsel to the Treasury Department, 24 Taxes 980 October 1946.
We venture to predict that when this type of legislation is enacted by the
Congress, many of the common law states, including Pennsylvania, which adopted
community property statutes with such haste will just as speedily repeal them.

